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We compare the effects of two prominent organizational control mechanisms—social
pressure and monetary incentive—on cognitive control. Cognitive control underlies the
human ability to regulate thoughts and actions in the pursuit of behavioral goals.
Previous studies show that monetary incentives can contribute to goal-oriented behavior
by activating proactive control. There is, however, much less evidence of how social
pressure affects cognitive control and task performance. In a within-subject experimental
design, we tested 47 subjects performing the AX-CPT task to compare the activation
of cognitive control modes under social pressure and monetary incentive beyond mere
instructions to perform better. Our results indicate that instructing participants to improve
their performance on its own leads to a significant shift from a reactive to a proactive
control mode and that both social pressure and monetary incentive further enhance
performance.
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INTRODUCTION
Organizations often implement formal control mechanisms to enhance the performance of their
employees. Although such mechanisms can be designed in various ways, they all fundamentally
rely on the use of positive and negative incentives, which are often monetary or social. Their
positive effect on performance is thought to occur because they induce increased cognitive effort
in employees (Curley et al., 1986; Trautmann et al., 2008; Vieider, 2009). However, the limited
effectiveness of incentive-based organizational control systems is increasingly acknowledged
in the management control literature. The reason may lie in the fact that control systems
are predominantly designed to stimulate goal-oriented behavior with performance contingent
incentives, whereas in a growing number of tasks the best performance is achieved by flexible
adaptation to a changing environment. Performance contingent incentives may, for example,
suppress learning and creativity at the individual level, thereby hampering social and economic
innovation in organizations and society (Collins and Collins, 2002; Sen, 2008). Thus far, no simple
control solution has been found to regulate this. Mainstream management control literature still
associates human decisions that deviate from goal-oriented behavior, those that are flexible and
influenced by emotions (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003) with weaker impulse, emotional, and
cognitive control.
This lack of understanding of the consequences of different incentives is in stark contrast
with the trend to implement various mechanisms wherever they seem needed to control human
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behavior. To fully understand and to properly and effectively
implement management control, further research on their effects
on fundamental cognitive processes is needed. In this study,
we focus on the ability to engage cognitive control and to
change cognitive control strategies in response to monetary
incentives and social pressure. Social pressure arises from
mere identifiability of results and performance evaluation by
others (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999), which in turn may create
anxiety or a fear of failure. The effect of social pressure on
performance is not straightforward. For example, Schmid et al.
(2015) report that fear of public embarrassment and negative
evaluation, born out of the need to perform well in front of
others may, paradoxically, impair performance. On the other
hand, transparent performance evaluation in organizations is
found to positively affect performance (Latham and Locke, 2006).
Given the ever-increasing amounts of money spent to incentivize
managers, we were specifically interested in the effect of social
pressure compared to monetary incentives on cognitive control
and the enhancement of cognitive performance. While the effect
of monetary incentives has been extensively documented in
cognitive psychology (Locke and Braver, 2008; Braver et al., 2009;
Dambacher et al., 2011; Padmala and Pessoa, 2011; Chiew and
Braver, 2013, 2014; Fröber and Dreisbach, 2014), the effect of
social pressure on performance in cognitive tasks has received
little attention. To the best of our knowledge, these two types of
incentives have not yet been directly compared within a single
study. To account for their specific effects, we contrast them to
the effects of mere instructions.
Cognitive control denotes the ability to manage one’s own
cognitive processes and is typically related to a number of
processes such as working memory, reasoning, problem-solving,
task flexibility, planning, and execution (Cohen et al., 1996;
Braver and Barch, 2000; Botvinick et al., 2001; Miller and
Cohen, 2001; Braver et al., 2002). It enables the regulation of
thoughts and actions in pursuit of behavioral goals (Braver,
2012). It is essential in directing attention to a stimulus, shifting
response strategies according to changes in the environment,
and inhibiting more automatic or habitual response tendencies
(Robertson et al., 2015). Cognitive control is exerted to supersede
self-serving impulses and engage in socially desirable behavior
(Pitesa et al., 2013). It is, hence, one of the most important
determinants of efficient goal directed cognitive and behavioral
performance.
According to the Dual Mechanism of Control theory (DMC;
Braver et al., 2007), cognitive control operates through two
distinct operating modes: proactive and reactive control (Braver
and Barch, 2002; Braver et al., 2009; Braver, 2012). The proactive
mode is future-oriented, helping to prepare the cognitive system
for forthcoming events through the predictive use of current
context. The processing of information occurs in a sustained,
goal-oriented way. In contrast, reactive control is retrospective,
backward-looking and reacts to the presence of urgent events
by engaging control only if needed. Thus, the processing
of information occurs in a more automatic, stimulus-driven,
transient, and reflexive fashion (Braver, 2012).Whereas proactive
control is based on anticipating and preparing for certain
situations and events before they occur, reactive control is based
on detecting conflict and implementing a response after its onset.
Braver et al. (2007) hypothesize that a cognitive system’s default
mode is reactive control since it is usable in more situations
and has lower demands on metabolic resources. In contrast, the
proactive control mode is only temporarily invoked in more
complex situations that demand more cognitive effort. DMC
presents a useful framework for explaining dynamic shifts in the
use of cognitive strategies in response to various stimuli.
Extensive research provides robust evidence that monetary
incentives activate the proactive control mode (Locke and Braver,
2008; Braver et al., 2009; Engelmann et al., 2009; Jimura et al.,
2010; Padmala and Pessoa, 2011; Chiew and Braver, 2013, 2014;
Fröber and Dreisbach, 2014). Neuroscientific studies suggest
that proactive and reactive control can be clearly distinguished
in the activity of different brain regions (Braver et al., 2007,
2009). Proactive control, directed to reward maximization, is
associated with increased sustained activity in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), which is believed to be central
in actively maintaining goals and instructions. It influences
information processing in other brain regions in line with
maintained information. The DLPFC is interconnected with the
midbrain DA system, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and
the medial temporal lobe complex. The constant firing of the
DA system that signals reward-related salience of predictive cues
ensures a sustained activity of the DLPFC. Reactive control,
on the other hand, is not oriented to maximizing rewards
but to resolving interference. The dorsal ACC (dACC) is
associated with conflict monitoring. When detecting a response
conflict or an impending error, it rapidly signals the need for
increased control to the DLPFC on the current trial and is
only transiently activated (Sawaguchi et al., 1988; Sawaguchi
and Goldman-Rakic, 1991; Arnsten et al., 1994; Schmid et al.,
2015).
There is contradictory evidence of how social pressure
contributes to goal-oriented cognition and behavior. The
identifiability of results is known to be influential in directing
agents’ behavior. As argued by Lerner and Tetlock (1999),
the mere presence of a superior and knowledge of his/her
expectations elicits conforming behavior. Moreover, setting
ambitious goals, which are accepted by the employee, can be
a powerful driver of performance improvement (Latham and
Locke, 2006). People’s natural tendency to behave in conformity
with the expectations of those they are accountable to, albeit
without an explicit monetary incentive, has been documented
by a large body of research (Cialdini et al., 1976; Tetlock,
1983; Tetlock et al., 1989; Klimoski and Inks, 1990; Quinn and
Schlenker, 2002). The reason for such behavior may lie in a
broader definition of motivation according to which both the
anticipation of a possible reward or the avoidance of sanctions
facilitate behavior (Taylor et al., 2004).
According to other accounts (e.g., Hickman and Metz, 2015;
Schmid et al., 2015) the transparency of results and their
identifiability may be perceived as a socially threatening stimulus,
which requires conflict processing during task execution. Schmid
et al. (2015) report that individuals who are more sensitive to
such pressures rely more heavily on a reactive control strategy
driven by conflict-processing dACC activity and that socially
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anxious individuals show poorer performance compared to
less anxious ones in cognitive tasks that require goal-directed
behavior. Hickman and Metz (2015) analyzed a phenomenon
common in sport, but also in other contexts, whereby large
rewards and expectations create such psychological pressure that
the performance eventually worsens (known as choking). They
recognize that the intertwining effects of explicit monitoring and
high rewards are difficult to disentangle, but after controlling for
them, they provide evidence of a negative relationship between
the size of the reward and the performance.
To investigate how social pressure influences cognitive control
modes and cognitive performance compared to monetary
incentive beyond simple instructions to perform better, we
employed a within-subjects experimental design in which 47
students performed the AX-Continuous Performance Task (AX-
CPT; Cohen and Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Servan-Schreiber et al.,
1996; Braver et al., 2001) under social pressure, monetary
incentive, and a control condition (instructions only). This
cognitive task measures goal representation, maintenance, and
information updates, and has often been used to examine
underlying modes of cognitive control (Barch et al., 1997; Braver
et al., 2001, 2005; Braver and Bongiolatti, 2002; McDonald
and Carter, 2003; Paxton et al., 2006, 2008; Locke and Braver,
2008). Due to conflicting evidence regarding social pressure
on cognitive performance, we did not have strong a priori
predictions related to its effect on cognitive control strategy and
performance.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants and Task
Fifty-six undergraduate students (age M = 21.96, SD =
1.76, range = 18–27 years; 19 male) majoring in Accounting,
Management, and Finance at the Faculty of Economics at the
University of Ljubljana took part in the study. Their work
experience ranged from 0 to 9 years (M = 2.95, SD =
2.36). Participants were invited to participate in the study as
an opportunity to earn course credits. Linked to their task
performance, students could also earn monetary reward ranging
between EUR 0 and EUR 6. The average amount earned was
EUR 3.7 for 45min of activity, which approximately corresponds
to the hourly rate for student work. All participants were
informed that their participation was voluntary and that they
were free to withdraw from the study at any point. They gave
written informed consent prior to participation in the study. The
study and the procedures followed were in accordance with the
Helsinki Declaration as revised in 2013.
Nine participants (16.07%) were eliminated from further
analysis due to the lack of correct responses in the AY trials in one
or more manipulated incentive conditions1. Our final analysis
1As we computed reaction times for correct responses only, we excluded these
subjects from reaction time analyses due to missing values. To keep the same
set of subjects in all analyses, these subjects were also excluded from analyses of
error rates. Due to a concern that the absence of correct responses in AY trials
might reflect an extreme use of proactive control strategy, we repeated the error
rate analyses including all subjects. The results remained stable with no change in
the observed effects (both the significance and the sign of the effects remained the
included 47 participants (16 male, age M = 21.92, SD = 1.84,
range = 18–27 years; work experience M = 2.92, SD = 2.27,
range= 0–9 years).
We used the AX-CPT task developed to measure proactive
and reactive control modes (Braver, 2012). The task was the
following: Pairs of letters were displayed sequentially on a
computer screen. The first letter, either A or B, appeared as a
cue. The second letter, either X or Y, was considered the probe.
In combination, there were four types of trials, i.e., AX, AY,
BX, and BY trials (Kam et al., 2012). The participants’ task
was to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to each
probe following the cue. Specifically, participants had to press
the letter N with their index finger when A was followed by a
target probe X (target trial). The three other trial types were non-
target trials in which A was followed by Y, or B was followed
by either Y or X (AY, BY, and BX). In the case of a non-target
trial, participants had to press the letterM with their middle
finger. In the calibration phase, participants performed a block
of 30 trials to calibrate the criterion for the response speed for
each individual. Then, four blocks of 30 trials were presented
for each of the three different incentive conditions. Thus, overall
the participants performed 390 trials. Within each block, the
most common trial presented was the AX target trial, which
occurred in 70% of the trials, with the remaining 30% equally
distributed among the other three non-target trials (AY, BX, and
BY). These pairs were presented in randomorder. After each trial,
feedback was given to participants informing them whether their
answer was correct and fast enough (see Section Procedure and
Manipulation).
Because the target trial AX occurs with a high frequency,
it not only creates a strong preparatory attentional expectancy
triggered by the contextual cues (A = target; B = non-target),
but also creates a target response bias linked to the X probe.
Thus, the utilization of proactive control can be indexed on
AY trials (Chiew and Braver, 2013). The AY trial type requires
inhibition of a prepotent response, as a subject is primed to
make an incorrect target response as soon as they see cue A
(Kam et al., 2012). Thus, the AY trial type requires subjects to
alter their usual action plans and press the letter “M” instead of
the letter “N”. According to Chiew and Braver (2013), stronger
interference in these trials (in terms of greater errors and slower
reaction times) can be interpreted as the activation of strong
proactive control. Alternatively, reactive control can be indexed
on BX trials. The BX trial type requires subjects to actively
maintain a representation of the context provided by the cue
stimulus in their working memory in order to press the correct
button when seeing probe X (Kam et al., 2012). In this condition,
a subject has to keep in mind that cue B, and not A, was
shown before X. Stronger interference in these trials (in terms
of greater errors and slower reaction times) can be interpreted
as the engagement of reactive control/lack of proactive control
(Chiew and Braver, 2013). Relative performance in AY vs. BX
trials therefore provides an indication of whether proactive or
same). In the interest of clarity, we report only the results of subjects with complete
data.
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reactive control is dominant (Kam et al., 2012; Chiew and Braver,
2013; Lamm et al., 2013).
The AX-CPT task was programmed in the E-prime 2.0
software running on Windows 7 OS. The stimuli were presented
on a 19-inch LCD display. To familiarize themselves with the
task, participants first performed 10 practice trials during which
their performance was not recorded.
Performance feedback was provided after each trial. It was
presented for 300 milliseconds (ms). Trials lasted 4.5 s and
consisted of the following sequence of events (see Figure 1):
fixation (300ms), cue (300ms), delay 1 (2000ms), probe
(300ms), delay 2 (1300ms), and feedback (300ms).
Procedure and Manipulation
To individually calibrate the criterion speed of response to
the probe stimuli in the incentive conditions, the procedure
started with a baseline condition in which participants were
told to perform the tasks as fast and as accurately as possible.
Subjects performed the baseline block without any knowledge
of the subsequent procedure and incentives. We then introduced
three conditions in randomly interchangeable blocks. In all three
conditions, participants were asked to improve their speed of
response while still responding correctly. Participants in the
monetary incentive block, which was cued by a picture of money
(see Figure 1), were told they could earn EUR 0.05 for each fast
and correct response, but could be penalized with a deduction
of EUR 0.05 for each incorrect response. The speed criterion
was set so that participants had to match or exceed the speed
of the fastest third of all responses in the baseline condition. In
the social pressure condition, participants were told that their
results and ranking within the group of participants would be
publicly announced. This block started with a picture of eyes on
the screen (see Figure 1). The control block started with no cue.
This condition was introduced to account for the effect of mere
instructions.
The experimental design was block-based with
counterbalanced order of condition blocks across participants.
The advantage of a block-based experimental design is that
it allows the examination of a sustained motivational effect
on cognitive control dynamics rather than a transient effect
(Chiew and Braver, 2013; Lamm et al., 2013). The experiment
was conducted in small groups of 16 participants in a quiet,
well-lit room. After the task was completed, participants filled
out a demographics questionnaire and were informed about how
much money they had earned.
Data Analysis
To eliminate automatic button pressing and extreme outliers
from the analysis, we excluded responses faster than 2002 ms
and slower than 2000ms (2.26%; Schouppe et al., 2015) and all
incorrect responses3 (0.04%). In addition, responses that deviated
by more than two standard deviations from the conditions’ mean
2Due to a concern that in some conditions (BX and BY) fast response times might
reflect valid anticipatory responses, we repeated the analyses without excluding
reaction times faster than 200ms. This did not alter the results as neither the
significance nor the sign of the effects changed.
3Responses where neither the letter ≫N≪ nor ≫M≪ was pressed. Subjects
mistakenly pressed the letter B in eight cases.
FIGURE 1 | Trial structure and timing. An example of an AX (target) trial is shown with both a non-incentive (baseline and control condition—no picture) and an
incentive (monetary incentive—a picture of money; social pressure—a picture of eyes) cues. One of these three cues was shown on the screen during each condition
block, indicating the incentive type.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 93
Licˇen et al. Cognitive Control, Social Pressure and Monetary Incentive
were removed from reaction time analyses as outliers (4.20%;
Lamm et al., 2013). We tested for and found no significant
effect of age on performance. Task performance was measured
and expressed as the mean reaction time for correct responses,
mean error rate (percentage incorrect), and mean percent of
fast responses. The responses were considered fast enough and
correct if they matched or exceeded the speed of the fastest
third of all responses in the baseline condition. To estimate the
statistical significance of the behavioral performance data, we
performed a repeatedmeasures analysis of variance (ANOVA). In
cases where the assumption of sphericity was violated, indicating
that the variance of the differences between all combinations of
related groups was not equal, we adjusted the degrees of freedom
using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction method (Field, 2009).
To examine the underlying mode of cognitive control under
manipulations, we performed an additional analysis on a direct
measure of a cognitive control shift—a so-called proactive index
(Braver et al., 2009). The index was computed from reaction
times and error rates in the AY and BX trials as (AY− BX)/(AY+
BX) and measures the relative tendency for proactive control
(Braver et al., 2009). The proactive index calculation yields a score
between −1 and +1: the closer the score is to +1, the more
proactive is the cognitive control (Braver et al., 2009; Chiew and
Braver, 2014). Namely, if subjects are more alert to the preceding
cue and prepare their responses proactively, they will find it
harder to inhibit the inappropriate response in the AY trials
and will be even faster/make fewer errors in the BX trials, both
leading to a higher value of the proactive index. As in some cases
participants performed at ceiling, which resulted in a zero error
rate, we used a corrected error rate, computed using the formula:
(number of errors+ 0.5)/(number of trials+ 1) (Hautus, 1995).
RESULTS
The effect of the manipulations on task performance may be
expressed in terms of improved reaction time and/or accuracy.
We analyzed both, as well as any possible trade-off between them.
Global Incentive Effect
Under all incentive conditions, participants were asked to
improve the speed of their responses while still responding
correctly. The cut-off for correct and fast enough responses
was calculated for each participant as the speed of the upper
third correct responses for all trial types in the baseline
condition. There were 64.3% of such responses in the control
condition, 67.6% in the social pressure condition, and 68.3%
in the monetary incentive condition vs. the expected rate of
33.3%, had the performance remained at the baseline level.
Similar results were reported by Chiew and Braver (2013, 2014),
but only for the monetary incentive condition. Overall, the
results show that the incentive manipulation was successful
in improving performance. In accordance with the given
instructions, participants achieved a higher rate of fast and
correct responses in the control condition and in both incentive
conditions.
Baseline vs. Control Condition
To further assess the effect of the experimental instructions on
task performance, we conducted a two-way repeated measures
ANOVA with the within-subject factors condition (baseline,
control) and trial type (AX, AY, BX, BY). The analysis of error
rates showed a significant main effect of the condition, F(1, 46) =
54.7, p < 0.001, reflecting an overall increase in error rates in
the control condition (see Figure 2A), a significant main effect
of trial type, F(1.08, 49.5) = 81.7, p < 0.001, reflecting larger
error rates in AY trials compared to AX, BY, and BX trials, and a
significant condition × trial type interaction, F(1.19, 54.6) = 48.6,
p < 0.001, reflecting a larger increase in error rates from the
baseline to the control condition in AY trials compared to AX,
BY, and BX trials. To formally test the observed pattern of results,
we conducted follow-up paired t-tests that showed significant
increases in the control vs. the baseline condition error rates for
AX, t(46) = 2.16, p = 0.036, AY, t(46) = 7.41, p < 0.001, and BY,
t(46) = 2.07, p= 0.044, but not BX, t(46) = 1.17, p = 0.249, trials.
Furthermore, comparing the extent of increases between AY and
other trial types using paired t-tests revealed significantly higher
increases in error rates from the baseline to the control condition
for AY trials compared to AX, t(46) = 7.13, p < 0.001, BX, t(46) =
7.30, p < 0.001, and BY, t(46) = 7.19, p < 0.001, trials, suggesting
increased reliance on proactive control. No other comparison
in the extent of increases between different trial types revealed
significant differences (all p > 0.65).
The analysis of reaction times also revealed a significant main
effect of the condition, F(1, 46) = 55.3, p < 0.001, reflecting
an overall reduction in reaction times from the baseline to the
control condition (see Figure 2B), trial type, F(2.05, 94.3) = 179.2,
p < 0.001, reflecting longer reaction times in AX and AY
compared to BX and BY trials, and a significant condition ×
trial type interaction, F(2.33, 107.3) = 3.2, p = 0.037, reflecting
larger reductions in reaction times in AX, BX, and BY than in
AY trials. A pairwise comparison of the extent of reaction time
reduction between the different trial types revealed significantly
smaller decreases in reaction times from the baseline to the
control condition in AY compared to AX, t(46) = 3.09, p =
0.003, and BX, t(46) = 2.12, p = 0.039, but not BY, t(46) =
1.82, p = 0.074, trials, again suggesting increased reliance on
proactive control. Significant improvement in reaction times in
the control condition relative to the baseline may be interpreted
as conformance to instructions, even in the absence of a direct
incentive.
Practice Effect at Baseline
Due to the within-subject block design of the study, there is a
potential concern that differences between blocks reflect practice
effects rather than experimental manipulations. To address this
concern, we conducted a logistic regression on error rates and
a linear regression analysis on reaction times in the baseline
condition to test for the presence of performance improvement
with the task progression reflecting the practice effect. The
analysis was only conducted on the AX trials since they occurred
in 70% of the trials. As the trials were manipulated within-
subjects, the subjects were treated as a random factor and
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FIGURE 2 | Error rates (A) and reaction times (B) in different trial types and conditions. Error rates (A) and reaction times of correct responses (B) for each of
the trial types (AX, AY, BX, and BY) are shown for each condition.
intercepts were modeled for each subject separately. Statistical
significance was estimated using likelihood ratio χ2 tests.
Results of logistic regression of response accuracy (0 for an
incorrect and 1 for a correct response) on a trial number revealed
a significant positive effect, β = 0.08, χ2
(1)
= 5.36, R2 = 0.04, p =
0.021, suggesting that subjects improved their accuracy within
the baseline block. However, as on average subjects only made
1.32% of errors in the baseline condition and mostly performed
at ceiling, we conclude that differences in performance cannot
be attributed to practice effects. Results of a linear regression
of reaction times on a trial number revealed a non-significant
positive effect, β = 0.18, χ2
(1)
= 0.28, R2 = 0.54, p = 0.598,
suggesting the absence of the practice effect on reaction times in
the baseline condition.
We extended the analysis of practice effects to the
experimental blocks, but did not find any significant effect
on accuracy and reaction times in any of the experimental
conditions. We did find a small effect of fatigue reflected in
reaction times in the social pressure condition (for detailed
results see Supplementary Figure 1).
Taken together, no or minimal practice effect in the
baseline condition and no evidence of practice effect in the
experimental conditions reduces the possibility that the observed
differences between experimental conditions reflect practice
effect. As the purpose of the baseline condition was primarily to
ascertain individual criterion reaction time, all further analyses
focus on direct comparisons between the three experimental
conditions.
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Comparison of Experimental Conditions
To investigate the effect of experimental conditions on error
rates and reaction times, we conducted a two-way repeated
measures ANOVA with the within-subject factors condition
(control, social pressure, monetary incentive) and trial type (AX,
AY, BX, BY). The analysis of error rates showed an expected
significant main effect of trial type, F(1.06, 48.9) = 121.2, p <
0.001, revealing significantly higher error rates in AY trials
(see Figure 2A). Results also showed a significant main effect
of the condition, F(2, 92) = 3.6, p = 0.030. A follow- up
paired t-test between conditions collapsed over all trial types
revealed significantly lower error rates in the monetary incentive
condition compared to both the control, t(46) = 2.26, p = 0.029,
and the social pressure conditions, t(46) = 2.54, p = 0.015, but no
significant differences between the social pressure and the control
conditions, t(46) = 0.09, p = 0.932. Though the pattern of error
rates differed across trial types and seemed to be driven mostly by
differences in AY trials, the absence of a significant condition ×
trial type interaction, F(2.20, 101.2) = 2.4, p = 0.096, did not
warrant further post-hoc exploration. These results suggest that
the monetary incentive was the most successful in reducing error
rates.
The analysis of reaction times also showed an expected
significant main effect of trial type, F(1.87, 86.2) = 452.6, p <
0.001, reflecting the shortest reaction times in BX and BY trials,
somewhat longer reaction times in AX trials, and the longest
reaction times in AY trials (see Figure 2B). ANOVA revealed
a significant main effect of the condition, F(2, 92) = 7.7, p <
0.001. Post hoc paired t-tests collapsed over trial types revealed
significantly shorter reaction times in both the social pressure,
t(46) = 2.46, p = 0.018, and the monetary incentive condition,
t(46) = 3.74, p < 0.001, compared to the control condition,
and no significant differences between the social pressure and
monetary incentive conditions, t(46) = 1.23, p = 0.226. The
presence of a significant condition × trial type interaction,
F(3.19, 146.7) = 3.5, p = 0.015, warranted further investigation of
experimental manipulation on each of the trial types by means
of follow-up one-way repeated measures ANOVAs with factor
condition (control, social pressure, monetary incentive). These
revealed a significant effect of the condition in AY, F(2, 92) = 6.4,
p = 0.003, and BY trials, F(2, 92) = 4.3, p = 0.017, but not in AX,
F(2, 92) = 0.97, p = 0.382, or BX trials, F(2, 92) = 2.3, p = 0.110.
Additional pairwise t-tests showed that reaction times in AY trials
in the monetary incentive condition were significantly shorter
than in the control condition, t(46) = 3.46, p = 0.001, and in the
social pressure condition, t(46) = 2.24, p = 0.030. Reaction times
in BY trials under monetary incentive were again significantly
shorter than in the control condition, t(46) = 2.90, p = 0.006,
whereas the differences with the social pressure condition were
not significant, t(46) = 0.732, p = 0.468. The reduction in
reaction times under social pressure compared to the control
condition approached statistical significance, t(46) = 1.96, p =
0.056. These findings indicate that while monetary incentive led
to the strongest reduction in reaction times, social pressure had
a similar effect in stimulating performance. In line with prior
studies (Kam et al., 2012; Lamm et al., 2013; Chiew and Braver,
2014), participants had the slowest reaction time in AY trials
compared to AX, BX, and BY trials, indicating the prevalence of
proactive cognitive control.
Speed-Accuracy Trade-Off Effect
To exclude the possibility that the observed changes in
performance were due to a speed-accuracy trade-off rather than
an actual performance improvement, we conducted a correlation
analysis between the change in error rates and the change in
reaction times in the baseline vs. the incentive conditions. This
was of a particular concern since we observed higher speed,
but also higher error rates under the experimental conditions.
The results show a non-significant negative correlation between
changes in speed and error rates in the monetary incentive,
r = −0.02, p = 0.808, a non-significant positive correlation
in the control condition, r = 0.12, p = 0.107, and a small
but significant positive correlation under social pressure, r =
0.15, p = 0.036, indicating that subjects in the social pressure
condition managed to improve both accuracy and reaction times
(see Supplementary Figure 2). We can therefore dismiss the
concern that subjects achieved a faster reaction time on account
of significantly higher error rates. On the contrary, participants
improved their response speed without any significant loss of
accuracy, arguably by shifting to the proactive control mode.
Correlation between Incentive Conditions
Some people are more stimulated, have greater motivational
orientation and better cognitive resources than others. They
might be equally sensitive to monetary and social incentives,
while others are less sensitive to both. To analyze this issue, we
conducted a correlation analysis between the differences among
error rates and reaction times relative to baseline in incentive
conditions. The results show strong and significant positive
correlations between error rates and reaction times, respectively,
across all pairs of comparisons; between monetary incentive and
social pressure, r = 0.63, p < 0.001, r = 0.96, p < 0.001, the
control condition and monetary incentive, r = 0.72, p < 0.001,
r = 0.95, p < 0.001, and between the control condition and
social pressure, r = 0.68, p < 0.001, r = 0.94, p < 0.001
(see Figure 3). The high degree of correlation between effects in
the different incentive conditions suggests that the subjects were
similarly sensitive to the incentives.
Analysis of the Proactive Index
To specifically focus on the possible effect of the experimental
conditions on cognitive control, we analyzed a proactive index
(Braver et al., 2009), computed for error rates (Figure 4A)
and reaction times (Figure 4B). To examine the effect of the
experimental conditions on the prevailing cognitive control
strategy, we conducted a one-way repeated measures ANOVA
with a within-subject factor condition (baseline, control, social
pressure, monetary incentive). Results of the proactive index for
error rates showed a significant main effect of the condition,
F(3, 138) = 49.5, p < 0.001, reflecting substantial increases in
proactive control in all three conditions compared to the baseline.
Post-hoc paired t-test indicated significantly higher value of the
proactive index for error rates in the control, t(46) = 11.3, p <
0.001, social pressure, t(46) = 13.1, p < 0.001, and monetary
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FIGURE 3 | Correlation between experimental conditions in the performance change relative to baseline as measured by error rates (A) and reaction
times (B). Performance in terms of error rate (A) and reaction time of correct responses (B) under experimental conditions relative to baseline collapsed over the trial
type are plotted between the monetary incentive and social pressure conditions (1), between the social pressure and control condition (2), and between the control
and monetary incentive conditions (3). A positive correlation indicates that subjects were equally sensitive to both compared incentive conditions.
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FIGURE 4 | Proactive index for the error rate (A) and reaction time (B) in different conditions. The proactive index based on error rates (A) and reaction times
(B) is shown for each of the incentive conditions: baseline, control, social pressure, and monetary incentive. The closer the score of the proactive index is to +1, the
more proactive is the cognitive control.
incentive conditions, t(46) = 8.6, p < 0.001, compared to the
baseline. When comparing the three experimental conditions, a
slight reduction in the proactive index in the monetary incentive
condition compared to the control condition was not found to
be significant, t(46) = 1.7, p = 0.095, neither were all other
comparisons (all p > 0.30).
Similarly, results of the proactive index for reaction times
showed a significant effect of the condition, F(1.96, 90.2) = 11.2,
p < 0.001, again reflecting substantial increases in the proactive
index in the control, t(46) = 3.9, p < 0.001, social pressure,
t(46) = 4.2, p < 0.001, and monetary incentive conditions,
t(46) = 3.0, p = 0.004, compared to the baseline, indicating a shift
to proactive control in all three manipulated conditions. Paired
comparisons between the experimental conditions revealed a
significantly lower value of the proactive index in the monetary
incentive condition compared to the social pressure condition,
t(46) = 2.5, p = 0.015. The difference between the monetary
incentive and the control condition approached significance,
t(46) = 1.8, p = 0.080, whereas the value of the proactive
index did not differ between the social pressure and the control
condition, t(46) = 0.1, p = 0.941. This indicates that social
pressure and mere instructions shift cognitive control to a
stronger proactive mode than monetary incentive. The lower
proactive indices under the monetary incentive condition could
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be attributed to the possibility of being penalized for incorrect
responses, which forces an individual to make fewer errors and
have a slower reaction time in the AY trials compared to the social
pressure and control conditions.
A possible concern in the presented analysis is that a
change in cognitive control in one condition might persist in
subsequent blocks, confounding the observed results. As the
order of the experimental conditions was counterbalanced across
participants, we were able to address this concern directly.
We conducted a two-way repeated measures ANOVA with
the within-subject factors condition (control, social pressure,
monetary incentive) and a between-subject factor starting
condition (control, social pressure, monetary incentive). The
results of the analysis on the proactive index for error rates failed
to show a significant effect of either condition, F(2, 88) = 1.4,
p = 0.243, starting condition, F(2, 44) = 0.8, p = 0.437, or their
interaction, F(4, 88) = 0.5, p = 0.705 (see Figure 5A). Results
therefore indicate a similar shift to proactive control regardless of
which condition was presented first. The analysis of the proactive
index for reaction times also failed to reveal a significant main
effect of the condition, F(1.73,76.1) = 2.4, p = 0.103, starting
condition, F(2, 44) = 1.2, p = 0.323, or their interaction,
F(4, 88) = 1.1, p = 0.342 (see Figure 5B).
These results show that the order of experimental conditions
does not affect the observed proactive control indices. We
can therefore conclude that social pressure and instructions to
perform better indeed independently increase proactive control
rather than just continue the strategy adopted under the
previous task condition. Overall, the results show an increase
in the proactive control index in all three conditions, but it
was least pronounced under the monetary incentive condition,
irrespective of which incentive was presented first.
DISCUSSION
Incentives Improve Performance beyond
Instructions
To enhance our understanding of what makes incentives
effective, we need to examine how they affect the fundamental
drivers of cognition. It is increasingly recognized that different
incentives trigger distinctive cognitive coping strategies (Lerner
and Tetlock, 1999; Vieider, 2011). Our goal was to understand
how two prominent formal control mechanisms—social pressure
and monetary incentives—affect cognitive control strategies to
enhance performance beyond the effect of plain instructions
to perform better. Our results indicate that instructing
participants to improve their performance on its own leads
to a significant shift toward proactive control and performance
improvement compared to the baseline. Both monetary
incentive and social pressure lead to further improvements in
performance. The best performance in terms of the highest
accuracy and the shortest reaction times is achieved under
monetary incentive.
Our findings confirm prior results that monetary incentives
improve cognitive performance, specifically by activating the
proactive control mode, which enables participants to better
update and preserve goal-relevant cue information throughout
task performance (Locke and Braver, 2008; Jimura et al., 2010;
Chiew and Braver, 2013, 2014; Fröber and Dreisbach, 2014).
Interestingly, monetary incentive did not lead to the highest
proactive control index, but to increases in both proactive and
reactive control, an issue we specifically address below.
Social Incentives Elicit Proactive Control
and Enhance Performance
A specific contribution of our study to the existing research into
factors influencing cognitive control is its examination of social
incentives. The finding that social pressure also elicits proactive
control and enhances performance contrasts with studies, which
found that social anxiety and psychological pressure adversely
affect performance (Hickman and Metz, 2015; Schmid et al.,
2015). These opposing results may arise from a different
approach: the study by Hickman and Metz (2015) is an event
study investigating the psychological pressure invoked by high
prizes in sports designed to elicit maximum performance. They
found that such pressure negatively affects performance, but
that less experienced athletes are more affected than their more
experienced counterparts. Schmid et al. (2015) analyzed social
anxiety as a personal trait rather than as a response to a socially
threatening stimulus. For socially anxious people, compared to
a healthy control group, such a stimulus represents a stronger
conflict, which has to be processed by relying on reactive control.
In cognitive tasks in which goal representation, maintenance, and
information updates are required, the reactive mode leads to a
worse performance than the proactive mode.
Pessoa (2009) explains that a low-threat stimulus enhances
target processing as emotionally laden stimuli are prioritized.
In contrast, a high-threat stimulus diverts cognitive resources
toward processing the stimulus, which impairs performance. In
the latter case, the focus is on monitoring a conflict and resolving
interference, typical of reactive control. What also matters
is the task relevance of a stimulus: a task-relevant stimulus
improves performance as it directs more resources to the task,
whereas a task-irrelevant stimulus impairs performance. Our
findings indicate that social pressure may have been perceived
as a low-threat, high-relevance stimulus by the participants. It
is worth noting that Pessoa (2009) refers to stimulus-driven
threat effects elicited by trial-by-trial manipulations, whereas our
manipulation is block-based and gives rise to a sustained activity.
The differences between transient and sustained effects will have
to be analyzed in future studies as the present evidence in the
literature does not systematically examine them.
Instructions in the Absence of Specific
Incentives Improve Performance
Experimental studies tend to neglect the effect of the lab
environment on participants. As revealed in our control
condition, performing better when being asked to may in
itself have a positive effect on performance through a natural
inclination to obey authority (Milgram, 1974). In several of our
analyses, we found similar effects between the two incentives and
the control condition. This implies that, when participating in
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FIGURE 5 | The effect of the experimental condition order on the proactive index for error rates (A) and reaction times (B) in different conditions. The
proactive index for error rates (A) and reaction times (B) is shown for each of the incentive conditions: control, social pressure, and monetary incentive depending on
the starting condition as a between-factor.
an experiment, mere instructions to improve performance have
similar effects to instructions that announce social or monetary
consequences. The studies that do not control for such a global
effect of instructions might falsely attribute the entire effect to
monetary incentives.
In contrast, the AX-CPT study by Chiew and Braver (2013,
partly replicated in 2014) employed an experimental design
comparable to ours. They directly compared block (sustained)
reward manipulations (non-incentive trials within the reward
block with non-incentive trials in the baseline condition) and trial
(transient) reward manipulations (incentive to non-incentive
trials within the reward block). Another valuable source of
comparison is Fröber and Dreisbach (2014) who partly replicated
the experimental design of Chiew and Braver (2013) with respect
to performance-contingent reward manipulation. The results of
all three studies are substantially similar to ours: they showed
a shift to proactive control for non-incentive trials within the
reward block compared to the non-incentive baseline block.
While the analysis of trial reward manipulation in the cited
papers (Chiew and Braver, 2013, 2014; Fröber and Dreisbach,
2014) focused on the transient vs. the sustained effects of
incentives, the non-incentive trials within the reward block
could be affected by instructions that activated proactive control
in the block. By this design, the authors managed to isolate
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the effect of incentives without confounding it with the effect
of instructions, similar to our control and monetary incentive
conditions, with the difference that their manipulation was
transient while ours is sustained. This difference is not negligible
as proactive control requires context representations to be
sustained over extended periods, whereas in the reactive mode,
the representation of the context is transient and maintained
only when needed. Non-incentive trials in the reward block
may thus be affected by a sustained proactive control mode,
triggered by incentive trials. In our design, these two blocks
are separate and there is less interference in terms of sustained
cognitive control activity between one and the other, leading to
clearer estimates of the instruction without incentive effect. All
three studies found a further significant shift to the proactive
mode for incentive trials (and significantly decreased accuracy
for AY trials) when comparing behavioral performance in
incentive and non-incentive trials within the reward block, a
finding qualitatively similar to ours. Taken together, these results
provide evidence that proactive control is already activated by
instructions to perform better, and may be further intensified by
incentives.
Error Penalty Leads to Balanced Increase
in both Proactive and Reactive Control
The analysis of the proactive control index in our study lead
to further insights. Whereas all three experimental conditions
induced an increase in the proactive index compared to the
baseline, direct comparison of the experimental conditions
revealed no differences in the accuracy based proactive index and
a decrease in the reaction time based proactive index in monetary
incentive vs. both social pressure and control conditions. This
seemingly contra intuitive finding needs to be understood in
relation to overall performance in the experimental conditions,
the relationship between proactive and reactive cognitive control,
and the nature of the proactive control index itself.
The proactive control index, as computed in this and previous
studies (e.g., Chiew and Braver, 2014), provides an estimate of
relative reliance on proactive vs. reactive cognitive control, rather
than an absolute measure of proactive control. If participants
switch their cognitive control strategy from a reactive to a more
proactive one, the index increases. If however, they rely on
more reactive cognitive control, the index decreases. Though
the proactive index computed in the AX-CPT implies that
the two cognitive control mechanisms are antagonistic, DMC
theory (Braver, 2012) postulates that proactive and reactive
control involve potentially independent mechanisms that can
be simultaneously engaged. Engagement of proactive control in
the AX-CPT task enables faster and more accurate responses
in trials in which the cue stimulus correctly predicts target
response, but it also leads to slower responses and higher risk
of errors in AY trials, in which the cue leads to incorrect
anticipation of a relevant response. To ensure fast responses and
low error rates in all conditions, the increase in proactive control
needs to be complemented with an increase in reactive control,
enabling swift and effective change in response in AY trials. The
overall improvement in both reaction times and accuracy under
monetary incentive compared to the other two conditions implies
that monetary incentive leads to an increase in proactive but also
reactive control: this is evident in the reduced ratio of proactive
vs. reactive control reflected in the lower value of the proactive
control index compared to the other experimental conditions.
Our results do not match the findings by Chiew and Braver
(2014), which found a significant increase in the proactive index
for error rates (but not for reaction times) in monetary incentive
vs. non-incentive trials. This apparent discrepancy can, however,
be ascribed to the differences in experimental design. In our
study, participants were not only rewarded for fast and accurate
responses, but also penalized for incorrect ones. This incentivized
them to increase proactive control to enable faster responses, but
also stimulated them to increase reactive control to avoid the
penalty for increased errors in AY trials. Together this resulted in
a smaller proactive control index compared to other experimental
conditions with no error penalties. Chiew and Braver (2013,
2014), on the other hand, did not include a penalty for error
responses in the incentive condition, allowing participants a
more aggressive pursuit of the goal, relying primarily on an
increase in proactive control without a concurrent increase in
reactive control. Interpretation of our results is further supported
by a functional magnetic resonance imaging study using the AX-
CPT task in which Braver et al. (2009) found that penalty-based
monetary incentives caused a shift from primarily cue-related to
probe-related activation in a number of PFC regions of interest.
It could be argued that including a penalty in the monetary
incentive condition prevents a direct comparison of the
effectiveness of monetary incentives and social pressure in their
ability to modulate cognitive control. We included a penalty
into the monetary incentive condition because the aim of this
paper is to contribute to practical implications. In organizational
environments, the primary goal is not to stimulate proactive
control, but to enhance performance, which includes appropriate
protection from low-probability errors. Additionally, in the social
pressure manipulation, we emphasized accuracy and speed (both
mattered for ranking) and as suggested by Dambacher et al.
(2011) the same is achieved with a penalty for errors, which also
emphasizes accuracy rather than just speed. If we had designed
monetary incentives with rewards only, the two conditions would
have been less comparable. Our results suggest that only an
explicit error penalty elicits concurrent increase in both proactive
and reactive control and ensures the best overall performance.
Monitoring as Performance Enhancer
As our results suggest, the key element in stimulating better
performance is a combination of explicit instructions and
monitoring, regardless of how monitoring relates to the ultimate
monetary rewards or social evaluation. There is an important
practical implication of this line of reasoning. For example,
measuring performance is a costly venture for most firms,
especially since such measurement should be objective to avoid
negative social comparison side effects. Without the need for
incentivizing or inducing pressures, simply observing working
behavior may come at a lower cost and lower risk of potential
dissatisfaction. Such positive effects can be expected especially
when monitoring can be organized horizontally (Komaki, 1986;
Towry, 2003).
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However, when combined with performance non-contingent
rewards, the instructions to perform better do not seem to
trigger a more proactive mode of cognitive control. Fröber
and Dreisbach (2014) compared cognitive strategies elicited
by performance-contingent and performance non-contingent
rewards. They showed that only the former shifts cognitive
control to the proactive mode (faster reaction times and higher
error rates in AY trials). In the performance non-contingent
reward condition, reaction times did not differ from the baseline
condition. In the reward manipulation coupled with a neutral
emotional stimulus, participants made significantly fewer errors
in AY trials, suggesting a shift toward a less proactive/more
reactive mode. However, in the condition combined with a
positive emotional stimulus, no effect on the cognitive control
strategy was detected. The performance non-contingent reward
scheme actually allowed the participants to perform worse and
be rewarded for it but, interestingly, their performance did not
deteriorate. They maintained the same performance as in the
baseline condition, whichmay be an effect of intrinsic motivation
and feedback.
Which type of incentives work best in an applied context
depends on current task demands and available context
information. If goal-oriented behavior is to be promoted,
incentives that stimulate the proactive control mode are helpful.
However, proactive control is not cost-free as evidenced by the
increased error rates in the trials that require inhibition of a
prepotent response. This might be especially important in an
applied context where errors must be avoided at any cost because
they have serious (possibly disastrous) consequences. For optimal
cognitive performance in such tasks, the reactive mode is a
better cognitive strategy as it is oriented to error detecting and
conflict monitoring. Dreisbach (2006) and Fröber and Dreisbach
(2014) found that a less proactive/more reactive mode was
elicited by positive affect. Positive affect was found to positively
influence cognitive flexibility (Isen et al., 1992; Ashby et al., 2002;
Dreisbach, 2006) and creativity (Amabile et al., 1986), while
a rigid imposition of incentives has been found to negatively
impact creativity (Stanton, 2000; Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002;
Frey and Osterloh, 2002). What further complicates the design
of an appropriate management control system is the finding
that the influence of positive affect may be easily overridden
by performance contingent incentives (Fröber and Dreisbach,
2014).
Limitations and Further Directions
The size of the observed effect of our monetary and non-
monetary incentive conditions also importantly depends on
the experimental design. Had we varied the intensity of each
condition (i.e., a higher monetary reward, more distressing social
incentive), their relative effects could have been different. It
would be insightful to test varying intensities of the presently
analyzed two conditions in future research. As the AX-CPT
is a relatively simple task, whereas real-world tasks are more
complex, variation in task difficulty could also lead to different
relative outcomes. A generalizable finding, however, is that
various incentive types are available in organizations to achieve
improved cognitive performance and that their ultimate effect
on performance depends on their relative intensity. We have
shown that not only monetary incentives but also non-monetary
incentives (ranking, instructions, monitoring) can be quite
effective. These findings provide an important contribution
concerning the effectiveness of various mechanisms within an
organizational control system.
Other limitations of our study need to be considered when
generalizing from our findings. By focusing on the comparison
between social and monetary stimuli on cognitive performance,
we did not measure social anxiety and reward sensitivity
as personality traits. As found by Jimura et al. (2010), the
strongest effects of monetary incentives on cognitive control
and performance in a high load working memory task are
observed in highly reward-sensitive individuals (an increase in
both sustained and transient activation of the right DLPFC). If
monetary incentive is coupled with trait reward sensitivity, the
effect is reinforced.
It is much more difficult to predict the interaction between
social pressure and trait social anxiety. A general finding in
the literature is that trait anxiety is associated with increased
reliance on reactive control, driven primarily by dACC activity
(Schmid et al., 2015) and right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
(VLPFC) activity (Fales et al., 2008). As presented by Schmid et al.
(2015), highly anxious people are particularly sensitive to socially
threatening stimuli, but a low-anxiety group can also be driven
to a reactive control mode by a threatening stimulus (Fales et al.,
2008). To our knowledge, there is little prior evidence on how
healthy individuals react to stimuli similar to the social pressure
used in this study. Our participants generally shifted toward the
proactive mode. Given the conflicting results in the literature
finding both, the positive effect (Latham and Locke, 2006) and
the “choking” effect of social pressure on performance, it might
be that our participants were not particularly socially anxious.
Low-anxiety individuals rely primarily on prefrontal cortex-
mediated control processes in cognitive conflict tasks (Schmid
et al., 2015). Low anxiety and increased activity in the DLPFC
is also associated with approach motivation (Harmon-Jones,
2003).
To rule out that the sample in our study could be
systematically skewed in personality traits resulting in
participants being more responsive to one or another incentive,
and to address some of the concerns that our results might be
affected by trait anxiety, or any other personality trait which
we did not measure, we investigated whether participants
might be differentially affected by the incentive conditions
used. The results showed quite the reverse: those who achieved
high performance under the monetary incentive condition
also performed well under social pressure and in the control
condition, and vice versa. This further indicates that monetary
incentives and social pressure have similar motivational
effects. To be able to generalize the findings to a broader and
possibly a more variable population, the moderating effect
of personality traits certainly needs to be addressed in future
studies. Nevertheless, we believe that the absence of personality
trait analysis does not limit the validity of the comparison
between stimuli-driven cognitive strategies: the sample is
relatively homogenous (in terms of age, which minimizes
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age-related differences in cognitive control preferences) and the
approach examines within-subject effects.
The next step in this line of research is to further validate the
behavioral findings using neuroscientific methods. Research in
cognitive neuroscience has already identified brain regions and
networks implicated in response to monetary incentives or threat
stimuli, and has examined their impact on cognitive control
strategies (Braver et al., 2007; Fales et al., 2008). Since behavioral
results demonstrate that social pressure and instructions shift
cognitive control toward the proactive mode, we would expect
to find sustained activity of the DLPFC similar to that elicited
by monetary incentives, typical of the proactive control mode. In
a trial-by-trial analysis, we would anticipate increased transient
activity of the dACC and DLPFC in the baseline relative to all
three conditions, in particular in trials that require response
inhibition. Another relevant direction for future research may
also entail testing other formal control mechanisms in order to
compile a comprehensive picture of incentive effects on cognitive
control. Greater understanding is needed about which control
environments in practice represent informational cues handled
by reactive and proactive control.
CONCLUSION
Our study provided the first direct comparison of the effects
of social pressure and monetary incentive on behavioral
performance. Surprisingly, whereas the results showed the two
incentive conditions to be comparable in their effect, much of
the effect seems to be generated by the presence of explicit
instructions to improve behavior and accompanying monitoring
of behavior. The key advantage of monetary incentives, primarily
ascribed to explicit error penalties, is ensuring that the increase in
performance in most of the trials enabled by increased proactive
control was not traded off by increased errors on those occasions
that required effective reactive control.
The effect of incentives and other situational factors on
cognitive control, effort, and performance will continue to offer
a vast opportunity to advance our knowledge. Making use of
brain imaging would allow us to identify the brain regions
involved in processing pressure/incentives in cognitive control
processes, which would provide important insights into the
effect of incentives on human cognition. Making incentive
systems work is vitally important for the overall functioning of
organizations and society. In recent years, research has focused
on the dysfunctional effects of these systems (Trotman et al.,
2011), which may be a consequence of the way conflicts between
incentives and natural (automatic) responses are resolved. Given
the current debate in companies and society about the problems
of increasing monetary incentives, our findings provide an
avenue to start reconsidering the essential role of social pressure
and monitoring in organizations, countering prevalent reliance
on monetary incentives to enhance performance.
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